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I. INTRODUCTION
The energy sector covers the coal, oil, gas and electricity sector. The European coal and oil
sector have already been liberalised in the past. The current debate concerns mainly the
electricity and the gas sector. In this paper we will concentrate on the electricity sector for three
reasons. First, the sector is more important in terms of value added, secondly it is considered to
be more complex and, finally, the opening of the electricity market precedes that of the gas
market. Obviously, this does not mean that the gas sector should not be studied as there are
many challenges left.
In section II, we discuss the institutional background for the liberalisation. Section III then
analyses the British experience. This is of interest because the UK has liberalised its market
about 10 years ago and this experience has been the subject of extensive economic research. In
the sections IV to VII, we focus on the four main problems in the liberalisation of the European
electricity market: the stranded costs issue, the cross-subsidies issue, the pricing of transmission
and the regulation of the environment. Finally, section VIII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
The different energy sectors
Traditionally, one distinguishes at least four different energy sectors that each use a different
energy product to satisfy the energy needs of the consumers. These are summarised in Table 1.
Trade in coal and coke was liberalised first in the EU in the early 1950s. At that moment it was
still the dominant energy vector, and its liberalisation was a necessary component of an open
market for steel. Whereas most of the European Union’s energy sectors are relatively healthy,
this cannot be said for the coal mines, which are chronically unprofitable and heavily subsidised
by national governments. The ECSC Treaty, which provides the legislative framework for the
coal and steel industry, prohibits state aid. However, in a series of framework Decisions over the
years, the Commission has the authority to approve aid provided by governments.
                                           
1 This text is based on work carried out for the Belgian Minister of Economic Affairs and for the K.U.Leuven Energy
Institute.3
The Commission made large efforts to persuade or coerce the Community coal industry to
reduce the very high operating costs by restructuring and closing pits. An important transition
took place at the end of 1993, when the new ECSC coal aid regime came into force, which
regulates state aid until the ECSC Treaty expires entirely in 2002. During the 1986-93 period, all
the coal mining industries in Belgium, Portugal, France and the UK cut back capacity and
reduced government subsidies ahead of or at least in line with the Commission's policy. For each
State, the Commission was concerned to ensure that subsidies decreased each year. In Belgium,
mining ceased altogether in 1992. France has made production cutbacks in recent years and is
now on a path to cease output by 2005.
Oil products became more important than coal in the 1960s. Most oil was imported and
processed by international companies, but the European oil sector has been liberalised for some
decades now. It is now the most open and liberalised energy industry in the European
Community.
Share of total final energy
consumed





Table 1 : The different energy sectors.
The electricity industry has been growing since its origin, as can be seen in Table 1. The sector
has also been a legal monopoly mostly run by public companies in many countries. This has
changed only very recently, as in 1996 all EU member countries were forced to organise
competition at the generation level while accepting regulated monopolies at the transport and
distribution level.
The conversion from coal based gas to natural gas in the early 1970s required a transition from
local production facilities and networks to an industry that relied entirely on international pipeline
networks bringing gas from the Netherlands, Norway, Algeria and Russia. In most countries, the
gas industry was a legal monopoly. The EU gas directive has been adopted in 1998. Member
countries have until August 2000 to develop the laws, regulations and institutions to liberalise
the gas market. The general principles of the gas directive are not different from the electricity
directive. However, the main element of competition in the gas sector comes from the possibility
to buy gas from different producers via non-discriminatory access to the network.
Electricity sector developments
The Directive 96/92/EC, concerning common rules of the internal market in electricity was
adopted by the Council of Ministers on December 19, 1996. It entered into force two months
later on February 19, 1997. The Directive starts with a list of considerations that have led to the
Directive. These are important for a clear understanding of the background of the Directive and
its overall aims. The ultimate goal is “to increase efficiency in the production, transmission and
distribution of electricity, while reinforcing security of supply and the competitiveness of the
European economy and respecting environmental protection.”
Basically, the Directive provides for:4
• free competition in generation, with either an authorisation or a tendering procedure for
building new generation capacity. Most countries have opted for an authorisation procedure,
which means that all parties that satisfy the safety, security, environmental and public
service criteria are able to produce as much as they want.
• a market on the consumers’ side, that is open to a minimum degree
2. The largest consumers
will be the first to benefit from an open market, smaller consumers will follow. A member
state that opens up its market for a larger percentage than provided by the directive, is
allowed to restrict access to suppliers from countries that did not open up to the same
degree (reciprocity).
• free access
3 to the transmission network via Third Party Access, a Single Buyer, or a mix of
these. The national transmission network (high voltage transport) has to be run by a system
operator that is responsible for the network maintenance and development and for the
dispatching of the generation plants. Most countries have opted for regulated access, which
means that the tariffs for the use of the grid are fixed and can not be renegotiated.
• an unbundling of accounts between generation, transmission, distribution and other non-
electric activities, if these are present within one company. The accounts must be
accessible to the regulatory authorities;
• public service obligations that may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity,
quality and price of supplies and environmental protection.
Even if the directive leaves some degrees of freedom to the member countries, it seems that
most countries opt for the same general orientations. Figure 1 summarises graphically the
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Figure 1: the effect of liberalising the electricity market.
The liberalisation of the electricity sector is well underway but this is not the end of the reform.
Many problems remain unsettled. In this text we will focus on four problems. First, we examine
two transition problems that have received special attention the last years: stranded costs and
cross-subsidies. Next, we briefly discuss how to set transmission tariffs and how to integrate
                                           
2 Certain consumers are defined as “eligible”. These consumers only can move on the open market.
3  Between generators and eligible consumers.5
environmental considerations into an open electricity market. We start however by surveying the
British experience. They liberalised the market in 1989 and we can learn from their experience.
III. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
In March 1990, the state owned CEGB was divided into 4 public limited companies: The
National Grid Company, PowerGen, National Power and Nuclear Electric. The 12 Regional
Electricity Companies (RECs), who owned the local distribution assets, were given shares in the
National Grid Company and were sold to the public in December 1990. In 1991, a majority share
of National Power and PowerGen was sold to the public. Initially, the nuclear power stations
were kept in the public company Nuclear Electric, but in 1996 this company was also privatised
(Newberry (1998)).
The electric power producers were privatised with long term British coal contracts above the
world market price and with long term contracts that guaranteed that the REC’s would buy an
important share of the total production. Both the coal contracts and the electricity delivery
contracts were to decrease in importance over the years. Initially, only the industrial customers
had access to an open electricity market, but from 1998 onwards all consumers are able to
select their supplier.
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Figure 2: The UK electricity market in 1995.
Wolfram (1999) gives a further description of the British electricity market system. All wholesale
electricity transactions in England and Wales go through a central pool. The pool is a “day ahead
market“ where for every day ahead, producers submit bid schedules that detail the prices and
capacities of each plant they are prepared to operate. The network operator uses these received
bids and demand forecasts to determine a system marginal price ( * p  in Figure 3). This is done
for every half an hour. The pool price that is received by all producers equals the system
marginal price plus an additional factor that covers the capacity cost. The vast majority of the
transactions are covered by direct contracts between generators and their customers. These6
direct contracts most often take the pool price as reference but can include different types of
protection against price uncertainties.
The pool prices are market prices and are not directly regulated. However, the industry regulator
(OFFER) possesses an important instrument for intervening in the pool when he judges the prices
as too high because he can refer the generators to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(MMC). This Commission can take drastic steps such as breaking up the existing companies so
as to create more competitors. As a result, the regulator’s appreciation of the pool price level is
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Figure 3: Determination of System Marginal Price.
What explains the price setting of generators?
In the UK, the breaking up of the CEGB resulted in a duopoly where PowerGen and National
Power restricted the capacity made available at low prices in order to get better prices. This was
demonstrated by Green and Newberry (1992). Wolfram (1999) analysed a longer period and






( P – MC )/P
Jan 92 – March 93 15% 0,241
April 93 – March 94 20% 0,259
April 94 – Dec 94 (price cap) 20% 0,208
4 weeks before a regulatory decision 0,329
4 weeks after a regulatory decision 0,156
source: Wolfram (1999) and own computations
Table 2: Mark-up values in the UK electricity sector.
                                           
4 This coefficient was constructed by dividing column 2 by column 3 of Table 2 in Wolfram (1999).7
This table shows clearly that mark-ups were important (of the order of 25%) and that two
generators was not enough to have perfect competition
5. Another sign of market control is that
after the setting of a price cap in March 1994, the generators were able to arrange prices that
matched almost exactly the price cap.
However, the mark-ups are below the theoretical mark-ups a duopoly could get. Column 2 in
Table 2 shows this: the realised mark up is only some 20% of the profit maximising mark up of
a pure duopoly.
Wolfram advances two factors to explain this restraint in their price setting behaviour:
• The presence of a regulator that can cap prices, send the firms to the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission, etc. The mark-up after a regulatory decision was always much lower
4 weeks after than 4 weeks before a regulatory decision (see Table 2).
• The potential entry of new competitors: pool prices were set just under a potential entry’s
long run marginal cost (CCGT plants) and pool prices followed the fluctuations of the gas
prices although gas plants were not the marginal plants.
Who gained from the introduction of competition?
Newberry (1998) and Newberry and Pollit (1997) analysed the costs and benefits of the
liberalised electricity market in the UK.
On the generation side they found very strong gains in productivity. They give the example of a
coal power station of 4000 MW that halved its labour force from 1200 to 600 people.
Productivity increases were realised as well in (the publicly owned) Nuclear Electric.
Important changes also occurred on the fuel side. Before the privatisation, the electricity sector
used about three quarters of the total coal production in Britain and paid coal prices above the
world market price. After a few years, these long term contracts for British coal were abolished
and cleaner and cheaper imported coal and gas were used instead. The British nuclear power
stations were build as a weapon against coal mine strikes and their construction and operation
was subsidised
6. Initially, these nuclear power stations proved non-competitive, but under
pressure of the market they also experienced large productivity increases.
Newberry and Pollit (1997) analysed the distribution of the gains of this liberalisation. They
found a permanent cost reduction in the order of 5% and important environmental benefits. The
major beneficiaries of these cost reductions were the new shareholders while the consumers and
the taxpayer actually lost money. This is possible because not all the productivity gains and fuel
price decreases were fully passed on to the consumers and the government. The major
explanation why important profits subsisted has to do with the small number of competitors on
the generation market.
Another factor is that before 1998, the small consumers that could not choose their supplier.
They have been forced to pay for the decommissioning liabilities of nuclear plants and, via the
RECs, for the expensive British coal used in power generation.
                                           
5 the nuclear generator wanted its units running continuously (base load) and did not have a large capacity therefore
there were only two real competitors.
6 The Thatcher government decided to build 10 Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR). In the beginning of the privatisation
there was an obligation for the RECs to buy nuclear power and a fuel levy to pay for decommissioning liabilities.8
According to Newberry (1998), governments are keen on privatisation but tend to restrict
competition. More competition reduces the privatisation receipts and the power to intervene.
Abuse of market power is an excellent reason for political and regulatory guidance. By using the
anti-trust suit, the government can persuade those with market power to burn more local coal,
or collect more money for specific consumer groups, to invest in green energy, etc.
Another lesson drawn by Newberry (1998) is that it has been very difficult to design a good and
cheap system for competition at the retail level.
A final lesson drawn by Newberry (1998) is that the Labour government’s ban on new gas fired
entry has decreased competition again. The objective of Labour was to stimulate the demand for
coal. The likely result is that the windfall profit tax imposed by Labour will be paid by the
consumers.
Note however that, even if some important lessons can be drawn, the European market
liberalisation cannot directly be compared with the British case. At least 3 important differences
can be identified.
• First in the UK, a public monopoly was privatised and broken up into parts that will
compete. In the EU, there is not necessarily a privatisation or a braking up of existing
companies, but a liberalisation via opening of national borders. The number of competitors is
also very likely to be higher than three.
• In the UK, there is one integrated national electricity network that allows competition
between generators in the same country. In the EU, there is a collection of national grids
that each are well integrated and that are interconnected to solve reliability problems.
However, the international connections were not designed to create one integrated
European market so that trade possibilities could be restricted in the first years of
competition.
• In the UK (England and Wales), there is one regulator and one market for power. In the EU,
there are national regulators and a European monitoring of competition.
We now move on with a brief discussion of some major issues that need some special attention
in the process towards liberalised electricity markets.
IV. THE STRANDED COST ISSUE
Stranded costs have to do with the transition from a regulated to a competitive electricity
market. They refer to the problem of recovering past investments costs and have been presented
as a major obstacle in the transition to an open electricity market. They are more typical in
electricity markets where the initial firm was a private monopolist because he will accept less
easily to absorb losses from past investment than a public company or than a public company
that is privatised. In the United States the market opening started a few years earlier than in
Europe, and the stranded costs concept was invented there. The discussion focused on several
questions, such as what is the exact definition of stranded costs? Should the industry be able to
recover them? If so, who should pay for them? And how should they be recovered?
In the European Directive, there is an explicit provision dealing with stranded costs (article 24).
Obviously, the definition of stranded costs is crucial as this will have an effect on the ultimate
stranded cost estimate. For Belgium, stranded cost estimates ranged between 500 M EURO and
5000 M EURO. We now present our definition of stranded costs. Furthermore, we show when9
stranded costs will exist and what are the consequences of allowing generation firms of
recovering them.
A. A definition of stranded costs
Before the liberalisation, electricity generating firms made different expenditures that are
considered sunk or fixed. It would be wrong to label all of them as unrecoverable or ‘stranded’
when the electricity market is opened up. Some of these costs would also have been made in a
competitive market. But some are typical for a firm operating in a regulated market. Because
they were imposed by the regulator, or because the firm chose to make these costs. Concerning
the first category, the fixed or sunk costs imposed by the regulator, one could argue that it
should be allowed to the firm to recoup these costs, whatever the market structure is. We will
call them strandable costs. However, it is difficult to defend this position for the latter category
of fixed costs.







Full recovery Not stranded Not stranded
RECOVERABLE VIA
THE MARKET Partial recovery Non-recoverable
part is stranded
Not stranded
No stranded Not stranded
Table 3: The definition of strandable and stranded costs.
This is summarised in Table 3. Two categories of fixed or sunk costs are distinguished, those
imposed by the regulator and those resulting from decisions taken by the firm itself. In this
paper, the costs in the first category are called strandable, those in the second category are not
strandable. If stranded costs are present, then they should be in the strandable category, the
non-strandable costs cannot become stranded. But not all strandable costs are necessarily
stranded, since some of them can be (partially) recovered via the market. Only those strandable
costs that can not be recovered via the market are stranded. In the table the shaded area
indicates the stranded costs.
Summarising, strandable costs are defined as those fixed and sunk costs that were imposed by
the regulator in the regulated market. Stranded costs are then defined as strandable costs that
cannot be recovered via the market if the market is opened up for competition. Comparing this
latter definition with other ones in the literature learns that it closely resembles the one given by
Baumol, Joskow and Kahn
7. However, our definition puts more emphasis on the role of the
regulator or the supervising authority. We stress that the regulator should impose the
expenditures, whereas Baumol et. al. include expenditures approved by the regulator. Clearly,
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the latter is a much broader definition of stranded costs because it implicitly opens the door for
all sunk costs made by the regulated firm to become stranded.
B. The economics of stranded costs : A graphical analysis
The link between strandable costs, stranded costs and other cost concepts can be illustrated
graphically. This section presents this illustration. Furthermore, it tackles questions such as
when do stranded costs exist? If stranded costs exist, are there economic reasons to allow for
stranded costs recoupment? Can, on a theoretical basis, anything be said about the size of the
stranded costs? Each of these questions is answered by using the graphical tool and the analysis
is kept as simple as possible
8.
The regulated market
Assume that the total demand for electricity is perfectly inelastic and equals  D q , which
corresponds to the size of the horizontal axis. Initially, there is only one generation firm. This
firm is called the incumbent and its cost structure is shown in figure 2. It is assumed that the
average cost of electricity generation ( 0 i l ‡ ) decreases for some smaller levels of output, but in
the range we are considering the average cost of electricity generation is increasing. The
incumbent’s marginal cost of electricity generation is assumed to increase linearly
9. The average
variable cost is labelled  AVCI . The vertical distance between  ACI  and  AVCI  is a measure of
the average fixed generation cost  AFCI . The present analysis only considers the cost of
electricity generation.
We assume that it is compulsory in the regulated market to meet the market demand and that
the regulator sets the price for electricity generation such that economic profit equals zero, i.e.
p AC q
R
I D = ( ) . The latter assumption is made for illustrative purposes, and has no effect on
the conclusions of the analysis.
The liberalised market
Now assume that the market for electricity generation is opened up for competition and that the
market demand for electricity remains equal to qD . Furthermore, assume that several potential
entrants are competing for a market share and that each of these entrants has sufficient
capacity to supply the market at a constant marginal cost ( MCE ). This assumption may be a
good approximation for what will happen on the Belgian electricity market. Belgium is a small
                                           
8  More particularly, we focus on a market with one homogenous commodity. This can be electricity delivered at a
constant flow over the year with a given level of quality. Using a multiproduct approach for electricity (peak, off peak,
etc.) is more realistic but will obscure the stranded costs analysis in this section without adding value to the
argument.
9  The linearity of  MCI  (and thus also  AVCI ) is assumed for the sake of simplicity. Unless it is mentioned explicitly,
this does not influence the main conclusion of the analysis.11
open economy, with a relatively small production capacity compared to the available capacity in
the surrounding countries
10.
Competition between entrants ensures that the entrant’s price equals his marginal cost.
Furthermore, we assume that if the incumbent increases his price above the entrant’s marginal
cost, then he would immediately be pushed out of the market.
In Figure 4 the market demand for electricity qD is supplied by two generation firms, the
incumbent (I) and the entrant (E). The vertical axis on the left-hand side is the incumbent’s axis,
the entrant’s axis is at the right-hand side.
The competitive outcome
Under the assumptions listed above, the competitive market outcome will always be such that
p MC MC I E = = , which is generally accepted as optimal from an efficiency point of view. In
Figure 4, the incumbent’s output would reduce to q*, whereas the entrant’s output would be
( ) q q D - * . The implied price of electricity generation decreases ( p p
C R < ), but this is not a


















Figure 4: The competitive market.
Economic welfare
It can be shown that in this simple model social welfare increases as the market is liberalised.
Furthermore, it can also be shown that the change in social welfare is equal to the efficiency
gain that is made through improved production efficiency. The shaded area in Figure 4 is a
measure of this ‘benefit’.
                                           
10  It is assumed that one entrant enters the domestic market. The results would not change if more than one competitor
would enter. The assumption of perfectly inelastic demand for electricity is acceptable in the short run and helps the
exposition.12
The stranded costs
In order to show the stranded costs in a figure, we need to take a closer look at the fixed costs.
According to our definition, only those fixed or sunk costs imposed by the regulator are
candidates to become stranded, i.e. are strandable. In order to make this distinction, the fixed
costs are divided in strandable and non-strandable fixed costs ( FS  and FNS ). This results in the
AF C NS I -curve in Figure 5 and Figure 6, which represent the average non-strandable fixed costs.
Now, consider two cases
11.
The market price covers the average costs
In Figure 5, both the strandable and the non-strandable fixed costs are covered by the market
price. The domestic firm produces  * q  and makes an economic profit equal to the area
p E E D
C
1 2 . As was said before, from an efficiency point of view this market outcome is optimal.
There is no reason why the government or any other regulator should intervene by allowing the
recovery of strandable costs since the market automatically arrives in a Pareto-optimal situation.
























Figure 5: The competitive price is higher than the average cost of the incumbent.
The market price does not cover the average costs but does cover average variable costs
In this case, the market outcome could be as shown in Figure 6. Standard economic theory then
suggests that in the short run the firm will stay in the market since stopping activity will only
imply an even larger loss. The point E1 indicates the short run price-output combination for the
incumbent firm. This point implies a loss per unit of output equal to E E 2 1 and a total loss equal
                                           
11 Note that other definitions of strandable costs would result in an other position of the 
NSI AFC -curve.13
to the rectangle  DE E p
C
2 1 . The stranded costs in this case are equal to that part of the


























Figure 6: The competitive price is lower than the average cost of the incumbent.
Again, there is no case for allowing stranded costs recovery from the point of view of efficiency.
The incumbent incurs a loss due to the presence of strandable costs, but this does not influence
the output decision. The Pareto-efficient output will still be the outcome.
One could also turn around the question: is there a case for not allowing stranded costs
recovery? No, there is neither. If the incumbent is allowed to recover stranded costs and if the
recovery is organised in a competitively neutral way, then the firm will choose the same Pareto-
efficient output. The difference between both cases is that the burden of stranded costs is
(partially) shifted from the firm to the consumers and/or the government.
Standard economic theory also suggests that a firm, not able to cover its fixed costs in the short
run, will leave the market in the long run. This is true, but in the present model, the situation
might be slightly different because strandable costs are a short run phenomenon. In the long run,
the owners of the firm will absorb the strandable costs, and the firm will only reoptimise its non-
strandable fixed costs. If it is possible for the firm to cover its long run average costs (now not
containing any strandable costs anymore) with the market price, then it will stay in the market.
If on the other hand, the firm is not able to cover its long run average costs through the market
price, then it will leave the market. From an efficiency point of view, this would even be optimal.
This reasoning puts an upper limit on the financial support for stranded costs recovery. The
support should not be larger than the amount of the strandable costs. If the regulator sets the
compensation at a level that covers more than the strandable costs, then he is subsidising some
of the non-strandable fixed costs of the incumbent, which may create the wrong incentives for
the incumbent. The incumbent may decide to stay in the market, whereas we know that this is
not optimal from the point of view of efficiency.14
Some simulation exercises
A simple simulation model was used to test what could be the welfare effects of a transmission
fee to recover stranded costs on the Belgian market. The effect on welfare of opening the
electricity market for the big industrial consumers depends on the supply price of the foreign
producers and on the ease with which the big consumers switch to another supplier. When the
supply price of the foreign producer is only slightly lower than the marginal cost of the home
producer, opening the market could give welfare gains and higher profits for domestic generator.
The welfare gains come from imports at lower costs than the indigenous production. Despite the
loss of market share for the home producer, his gross profits are not affected much because of
two reasons. First, the protected market is responsible for the major share of the gross profits.
Secondly, the home producer might be able to charge higher prices at home for the market share
he keeps at home. Sensitivity studies show that the opening of the market does not lead to
negative profits and therefore that the strandable cost would never become stranded.
conclusions
When one is concerned about economic efficiency, allowing for stranded cost recovery is not
necessary. On the other hand, allowing for recovery would not hurt either, but if financial
support for stranded costs recovery is given, then it should be organised in a competitively
neutral way. Moreover, there is an upper limit to the size of the support, i.e. it may not be larger
than the strandable costs. Of course, if there is no recovery of stranded costs, then the firm will
make a loss on the home market but this does not result in inefficiencies.
V. CROSS SUBSIDIES
In most European countries the market is not liberalised at once. In general, one started with the
biggest customers, while the SME’s and the residential sector have to wait a few years before
they have access to the European market. This situation creates a potential for cross-subsidies
between the liberalised and the non-liberalised market.
This risk is one of the recurrent topics in the liberalisation debate and the Belgian Electricity law
explicitly foresees measures to avoid such cross-subsidies. One can expect an increasing
attention for the problem both from the side of the small consumers and from the competitors of
Electrabel. In this section we first examine the definition of cross subsidies and then we indicate
where and why cross subsidies occur. Next, we discuss the potential for cross subsidies after
the liberalisation and the ways to reduce or eliminate this potential. We conclude with a proposal
for reducing cross-subsidies.
The cross-subsidy definition
According to the economic literature, prices are cross-subsidy-free if they satisfy the following
two conditions 
12.
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• For each customer the price is below the average stand-alone cost for that customer. The
stand-alone cost is the cost for a customer of self-providing the good or the service. This
defines an upper bound on the set of cross-subsidy free prices.
• Each consumer is paying a price not lower than the average incremental cost. This defines a
lower bound on the set of cross-subsidy-free prices.
Note that price differences are not necessarily an indication of cross-subsidies, and uniform
pricing might still hide cross-subsidies.
The major disadvantage of this ‘definition’ is the size of the gap between the lower and the
upper bound of the set of cross-subsidy-free prices. Furthermore, applying this definition requires
a lot of information not readily available in practice. This makes that cross-subsidies are difficult
to identify. In this paper, we accept the existence of a cross-subsidy if a disproportional share of
the joint costs is included in the tariffs applicable for a given segment of the market.
Why is there a problem with cross-subsidies?
Prices convey important economic information. They should give incentives to customers and
producers to allocate scarce resources in an efficient way, i.e. to squeeze the maximum out of
the available resources. Prices containing cross-subsidies will confront the economic agents with
the wrong price signals.
In some cases, cross-subsidies were introduced intentionally, because it was deemed to be fair
that some customers paid more or less than other customers. In economics, however, a
preference is given to achieve income distribution goals via income transfers rather than via
subsidised prices.
Where can cross-subsidies occur?
In the regulated electricity market, the price level and price structure at the generation level were
set and controlled by the regulator. Cross-subsidies could easily be sustained because of the lack
of alternatives to the electricity customers. After the liberalisation, this type of cross-subsidies is
still possible in the non-liberalised part of the market.
However, prices for electricity charged to the liberalised part are now beyond the control of the
regulator and a cross-subsidy from the liberalised customers towards the captive customers is
not sustainable. Cross-subsidies from the regulated towards the liberalised part of the market
may still exist as the incumbent producers or traders will try to recover a disproportionate share
of their costs via the captive customers.
Because of its typical natural monopoly characteristics, it can be expected that the transmission
activities remain under the control of a regulator, who may create (or allow) cross-subsidies
between different types of customers.
The interaction of cross-subsidies at the generation and the transmission level depends on the
degree of unbundling of the generation/trading and transmission activities. The European
Directive on the opening of the electricity market requires integrated undertakings to keep
separate accounts for their generation, transport and distribution activities. In Belgium, the law
imposes that transmission activities are strictly separated from any other activity. If this16
separation is successful, then cross-subsidies between generation and transmission activities will
not exist. If the separation is only partially successful, and if the incumbent owner of the
transmission firm is able to influence the transmission prices, then cross-subsidies between the
two levels may occur.
Why do cross-subsidies occur?
Cross subsidies may arise because of political reasons, because one likes to give a preferential
treatment to some type of customers or because one does not want to charge the full cost of
providing a good or a service to a given customer type.
By definition, joint costs cannot be allocated to one product because these costs were made for
the production of more than one product. Some sharing rule is needed to allocate these costs to
the different products. Other allocation rules will result in other split ups of the costs, and using
a wrong sharing rule results in an incorrect allocation of the joint costs and thus – maybe – in a
cross-subsidy.
In most European countries, the ongoing liberalisation process in the electricity market has lead
to a claim from the sector for stranded cost recovery. Several instruments are available and
proposed to finance this transfer. If a fee is imposed only on the captive customers (e.g. a tax
on the distribution level), then this might result in a cross-subsidy from the captive customers to
the free customers.
Through predatory pricing, the incumbent firm tries to protect its market share in the liberalised
market by charging very low prices on that market. Charging higher prices in the captive market
then must compensate the resulting loss in revenue. This can be done, because in that part of
the market there is no risk of entry. The incurred short run losses are then compensated through
price increases and thus higher profits when the potential entrants are defeated. Such a strategy
assumes that the defeated entrants will not try to reenter once the prices have increased and
this is rather unlikely especially if the sunk cost involved in entering a market is rather small,
which is the case in the presence of overcapacity in generation equipment.
When the incumbent firm is supplying both the liberalised and the regulated part of the market,
and when price regulation is of the cost-of-service (COS) type
13, then the firm has an incentive
to allocate as much as possible its joint costs of production to the regulated market. In that
market, the firm can recover its costs through the regulated price. In the liberalised market, the
firm can increase its profit margin (keeping the price constant while decreasing the average
cost), since now only a small share of the joint costs is to be collected through that market.
                                           
13 Until 1999, Belgium had a pricing system that closely resembled COS regulation. With COS regulation, prices are set
such that a revenue requirement is realised. There are two major problems with this type of pricing. First, the
mechanism has little incentive power. The incentive power of a pricing scheme is measured by the pressure it puts on
the regulated firm to provide its goods or services at the lowest possible cost. Second, tariffs are not necessarily
close to the marginal costs and thus they do not necessarily provide incentives to consumers for a correct use
electricity.17
Existing voluntary cross-subsidies in the current Belgian electricity market
In Belgium, the price per kWh covers the cost of the generation, the transmission and (if
applicable) the distribution stage. Thus, not much is known about how the cost of the
transmission service is allocated to the different types of customers (large industrial customers,
small industrial customers (SME’s) and residential customers). It can very well be the case that
these costs are recovered from the customers by charging a fixed amount per kWh, irrespective
of the size of demand, the timing of consumption, … This would correspond to a so-called
postage stamp tariff. Aalbers et al. (1999) made some calculations for the Dutch transmission
grid and they conclude that the potential for cross-subsidies is quite large if a pure postage
stamp pricing method would be used
14.
If in Belgium an implicit postage stamp is used, then it is likely that the industrial customers are
cross subsidising the low voltage and (to a lesser extent) the medium voltage consumers. This is
because electricity generators supply their output mainly to the high voltage grid, and large
industrial customers usually take their electricity from the high voltage grid. Therefore, they
would only have to pay for transmission over the high voltage grid, whereas with a postage
stamp they also pay a part of the cost for transport over the medium and the low voltage grid.
Currently, a few small intentional cross-subsidies exist. They have to do with the stimulation of
the  production of “green electricity”, the stimulation of rational use of energy and the tariffs for
combined heat and power production. Overall they represent only a small share of total costs.
In the past, transfer pricing took place between the generation firm (Electrabel) and that part of
the distribution sector under the control of Electrabel. This mechanism exploited the difference in
the tax treatment of profits at the corporate level and at the distribution level. Thus, a cross-
subsidy may be (have been) present in the sense that mixed intercommunalities are (were)
paying too low prices for their electricity compared to the prices paid by the other customers.
According to the regulator of the captive market (the CCEG), this mechanism is not operational
any more as there is now a fiscal compensation in place. One is also thinking about applying the
same tax rate at the distribution level as well as at the corporate level.
Cross-subsidies in a partially liberalised Belgian electricity market
Competitive forces will push the market price for electricity generation towards a level that more
closely reflects the marginal cost of electricity generation. Therefore, existing cross-subsidies
from the liberalised part of the market towards the captive part of the market cannot be
sustained.
On the other hand, existing cross-subsidies from the regulated part of the market to the non-
regulated part of the market will continue as this helps the incumbent firm to improve its
                                           
14 On the basis of the figures in their report, a pure postage stamp price of 0.700 BEF per kWh was calculated. If the
price would be differentiated according to the customer type (high voltage, medium voltage and low voltage
customers), then Aalbers et al. (1999) find transmission prices ranging from 0,256, over 0,531 to 1,025 BEF per
kWh, respectively. With a further differentiation according to the voltage level at the generation side, the price
differences would become even larger.18
competitive position in the liberalised part of the market (predatory pricing) or to make higher
profits in that market.
If the COS mechanism is maintained in the regulated market, the risk exists that the incumbent
firm allocates more than a fair share of the joint costs of electricity generation to the captive
market because of its de facto monopoly position in that market.
Major potential channels for cross-subsidies after the liberalisation
At the generation level, there is a clear incentive for the regulated firm to allocate a more than
reasonable share of the joint costs to the regulated market. Therefore, a careful and thorough
study of the cost allocation mechanism in the regulated firm is necessary, whatever the pricing
mechanism that is chosen in the regulated market (COS, price cap or yardstick). This is because
in each of the three cases, the initial price levels are determined on the basis of such a cost
allocation exercise. Basically, the three pricing mechanisms only differ in the way prices are
allowed to evolve in the later periods.
A second important channel for unwanted cross-subsidies is the transmission sector. This
activity remains under the (in)direct control of the incumbent firm. In the liberalised market, the
large industrial customers have three options:
• buy electricity from the current electricity producer (Electrabel);
• buy electricity abroad, or;
• invest in an own generation plant (CHP or CCGT).
Under the first two options, the transmission grid still needs to be used to supply electricity.
Under the last option, the use of the transmission grid is avoided (except for back-up services).
The presence of this third option indirectly puts a pressure on the pricing strategy applied by the
transmission company. If the transmission company sticks to a pure postage stamp tariff (and
the implied cross-subsidies), then this will give more incentives to the large industrial customers
to choose for an own CHP or CCGT installation.
Reducing the potential for unwanted cross-subsidies: a proposal
The current pure COS-based pricing rule should be abandoned because of the incentives it
provides to the regulated firm to allocate joint costs maximally to the regulated market.
Furthermore, COS pricing gives very little incentives to the regulated firm to produce in a cost-
efficient way. It is therefore preferable to move to a pricing mechanism that makes the firm the
residual claimant of its cost savings. This will give more incentives to the incumbent firm to look
for the most efficient production process, and to allocate the costs in a correct way. This pricing
mechanism could be a price cap system or a system based on yardstick competition. Two other
options to reduce the potential for unwanted cross-subsidies are to speed up the liberalisation
process and to organise a better control of the cost allocation.
A price cap scheme features high incentive power in the sense that the regulated firm is the
residual claimant of its cost savings. The regulator sets a price ceiling for each good or for a
basket of goods that is provided by the regulated firm. This price ceiling is then adjusted over19
the regulatory period on the basis of a price index
15. If the price ceiling is defined for a basket of
goods, then the firm has some discretion in determining the price structure within the basket as
long as the (weighted) average price of the basket is not above the price ceiling.
Giving some discretion to the regulated firm with respect to the price structure of the goods in
the basket is to be preferred above setting a price cap for each good in the basket. This gives
the firm more flexibility in adapting to changes in the cost structure. If necessary, some
constraints can be put on this discretion in order to avoid abuses at the level of cross-subsidies.
When a price cap system is added to a COS system that contains important cross-subsidies, it
can take a long time to eliminate the cross-subsidies
With yardstick competition, the evolution of the prices in the regulated market is made a
function of the observed evolution of prices in similar markets in other countries. Therefore, the
yardstick should be chosen carefully. This system requires careful preparation, as the underlying
characteristics of the different electricity markets can be very different. (The level of the prices
at the beginning of the benchmark period compared to the prices in the national markets, the
stranded cost policy, the size of the market opening…).
A second way to reduce the potential for unwanted cross-subsidies at the generation level is to
speed up the liberalisation process and to allow distribution companies to shop for lower priced
electricity.
The third way to reduce the potential for unwanted cross-subsidies is to organise a better
control of the cost allocation mechanism that is used by the regulated firm. A comprehensive
cost allocation analysis should be conducted on a regular basis. This exercise must be well
documented and the results must be made public.
Our proposal for the electricity market is to base the delivery prices for regulated consumers,
during the transition period 1999-2007, on a  weighted average of two elements:
• the cost of delivery using the present COS system;
• the prices offered by competitors in neighbouring countries for similar delivery conditions;
The weight of the second component will increase so as to reach 100% in 2007.
This system has three advantages compared to the continuation of the present COS system:
• It provides a smooth transition to the fully liberalised system;
• By introducing elements of a price cap, it contains a stronger incentive for cost
minimisation;
• By benchmarking the price cap in function of the prices abroad, one guarantees that gains in
productivity are also translated into the prices for the protected market segment.
In order to avoid cross-subsidy via the present COS system, it is necessary that the cost
allocation exercise is systematic and carried out in a more open process with independent
experts.
It is also advised to make sure that generation and transmission activities are fully unbundled,
not only in the legal sense, but also in practice. The obligation that generation or trading and
transmission activities are carried out by legally separated firms is not sufficient. In practice,
                                           
15 A well-known example is the RPI-X formula that is used in the British electricity sector.20
Electrabel will still be a major shareholder in the electricity transmission company. Monitoring
this separation of generation/trading and transport activities will be a difficult task and requires
access to detailed cost information of transmission activities.
VI. TRANSMISSION PRICING ISSUES
In the liberalised market, the network operator has an important but difficult role. He has to
make available sufficient transmission capacity for all trades between consumers and generators
and he has to cover his costs. First, we discuss the specific difficulties of running a transmission
network. Then, we review a possible pricing solution that has been proposed.
A. What makes transmission pricing of electricity difficult?
Transmission congestion
If transmission constraints are binding, so that the amount of power flowing through a line is at
the safety limit, cheap but distant generation may have to be replaced with more expensive local
generation, in order to reduce power flows. In the constrained area, the optimal price of
electricity rises to the marginal cost of the local generation, or to the level needed to ration
demand to the amount of electricity available
16.
Transmission losses
Even if there are no constraints, power is lost in the transmission process and prices should
reflect the fact that marginal losses are higher in some places than in others due to the distance
of the electricity transport Ceteris paribus, the higher the voltage level, the lower these losses
will be.
Other elements that affect transmission prices
Ancillary services
The costs associated with delivery of electric energy include many services. The direct fuel cost
of generation is only one component. In analyses of energy pricing, there is no uniformity in the
treatment of the other, ancillary services (transport lines with sufficient reliability, spinning
reserve, standing reserve, replacement reserve
17, reactive power (voltage control)
18,
 ’black-start’
                                           
16  Congestion has to be avoided for economic but also for reliability reasons. The total cost of capacity, losses and
reactive power requirements of a line are minimised when the line is loaded at around 50% of its capacity. For
reliability reasons, the loss of a line may not lead to a system collapse. With two identical lines in parallel on a route,
this is achieved automatically by not loading the lines above 50%. When alternative routes exist, higher loading is of
course possible. However, higher loading leads to an increased risk of voltage instability. Even though there is no
sharp limit, a maximum safe rating is calculated for every line, depending on temperature and power factor of
transmission over the line. It should be noted that power flows in the opposite direction of the dominant power flow
diminish the total power flow, and relieve congestion.
17  A characteristic of electricity is that it can not be stored. At each second, generation has to match demand, which
fluctuates unpredictably. This is the so-called generation-demand balancing. To achieve this, power plants do not
operate at maximum power, but keep a certain amount of reserve. The power output from all plants is constantly
adapted, automatically, in a matter of seconds. Reserve power is also used for compensating large unbalances, due to
e.g. errors in predicting demand and generator failures. If the amount of instantaneously available reserve power (the21
capability
19, active power losses, area control error
20). These services have to be supported by
adequate dispatching and metering systems.
Market power at the supply side
When at the generation side, the number of suppliers is limited (as will probably be the case in
Belgium), then strategic behaviour might occur in the sense that the suppliers will try to
influence the market outcome through their own behaviour. This might be possible, because
changes in demand or supply in one node of the transmission grid have an impact (through
transmission losses and capacity constraints) on the transmission prices in the whole grid.
Clearly, the possible existence of such behaviour must be taken into account when a pricing
mechanism is designed.
Green (1998) compares a nodal transmission pricing system with more simple mechanisms. His
conclusion is that using simpler pricing schemes decreases overall economic welfare, but not
necessarily to a large extent.
B. Alternative pricing systems for transmission
As regards transmission pricing, one has the choice between three types of pricing rules:
postage stamp, distance related tariff and pure marginal cost pricing.
We examine the performance of the three systems keeping in mind the three criteria to be
satisfied by a good transmission pricing system (Green (1997)):
• cost coverage;
• incentives for efficient operation, investment and cost minimisation by the transmission
company;
• incentives for optimal siting of new generation plants and important customers;
postage stamp
In a postage stamp system one pays for every transaction a fixed tariff per MWh , this tariff is
independent of the distance, place and time where the transport flow is needed. The major
advantage of this system is that it is easy to administer and allows to cover costs easily by
using average cost pricing.
                                                                                                                                       
spinning reserve) is used, other power plants that were at stand-by are started up (standing reserve). These power
plants are replaced in their turn by power plants designated as replacement reserve.
18  Power in an AC system consists of active and reactive power. Active or real power is the power component that can
be transformed in any other form of energy, such as mechanical energy. It can be transported over large distances,
although there always is some loss. Reactive power is needed to maintain the overall voltage level in the grid,
enabling the transport of real power. Reactive power itself can not be transported over large distances or imported
from other countries, i.e. it has to be produced locally.
The blackout in a large part of The Netherlands in the summer of 1997 is an interesting example of one of the risks
due to a large import of electricity (i.e. active power only) combined with a very significant independent generation
(decentralised production) and an inappropriate price structure. The independent generators are only paid for their
active power output. The ensuing lack of reactive power in the grid was the main cause of the blackout. It is clear
future price structures have to incorporate a compensation for the reactive power.
19  The ability to restart the power system after an overall black-out, without support from other countries.
20  Each country, or to be more precise each control area, performs generation-demand balancing, taking account of the
scheduled import or export. This intended level of import or export is called the area control error.22
The major disadvantages of this pricing rule is that it does not contain incentives for more cost-
efficient operation and no incentives for a good siting of investments in power generation of
power consumption.
distance related tariff
In this system, the tariffs are proportional to the (geographical) distance between the generator
and the consumer.
This system allows cost coverage and contains incentives for minimising the transport distance
between the generator and the consumer. Minimising geographical distance may not be a good
criterion as transport capacity may be in surplus on some links and may be too small on other
links. Furthermore, this system does not contain any incentives for cost-minimisation by the
network operator.
Marginal cost pricing
In this system the transmission price for a given trade is computed on the basis of the marginal
cost of this transaction. This marginal cost can vary according to time and location. It includes
the actual system cost (power losses, ancillary services) and the opportunity cost of transport
capacity. The latter means that, when there is a capacity shortage, one customer precludes
other customers from making interesting transactions. This is the theory, in practice there are
many implementation constraints.
The advantage of this system is that it contains different good incentives for correct use of the
existing transmission possibilities. It is however complex to manage. Furthermore, simple
marginal cost pricing does not guarantee cost recovery. Some kind of Ramsey pricing or two
part pricing is necessary to conserve the efficiency properties of marginal cost pricing and have
cost recovery. Finally, marginal cost pricing as such does not guarantee cost minimisation from
the side of the operator.
C. A proposal for Belgium
In the firmly linked Belgian grid, in which actual power flows are very difficult to predict due to
the large number of parallel paths and the dynamic characteristics (open switches or
maintenance), marginal cost pricing is almost impossible. Therefore, a pricing scheme starting
from a postage stamp method, with improvements to give incentives for optimal siting of new
generation and demand in the future, efficient use of the existing grid and cost minimisation is
proposed. The postage stamp is applicable to both producers and consumers.
We sketch some of the features of this proposal here:
Postage stamp for cost coverage and non-discrimination
The annual postage stamp tariff should allow the transmission company to recover its costs for
running the system while treating all grid customers, using the grid at the same time and place,23
in a similar way. Starting from the existing situation, these costs should include all functions the
system operator has to provide:
• maintenance, general improvement, increasing reliability and keeping the system in line with
the present state of technology– this cost will be referred to in short as ‘maintenance
cost’;
21
• reserve capacity (spinning reserve, standing reserve and replacement reserve);
• reactive power and voltage control;
22
• black start capability, bought by the transmission company from generation companies;
• losses in the grid;
• metering and billing of energy and power flow;
• personnel and operational cost.
Next to the actual costs, a fair return on investments should be part of the basic postage stamp
rate.
These costs are allocated to customers according to the following principles:
An individual cost component
Costs that can clearly be identified as being due to a particular customer are charged to this
customer. These include:
• connection costs (being different for different voltage levels);
• metering and billing, and;
• reactive power for outlyers.
A demand component
Fixed costs, i.e. maintenance, general improvement, increasing reliability and keeping the system
in line with the present state of technology, black-start capability and personnel cost plus the
fair return on investment, are charged per kVA peak demand.
In order to avoid cross-subsidies between grid users at different voltage levels, it can be argued
that all transmission clients (generators, consumers, traders, brokers,...) directly connected to
the extra high voltage grid (380, 220 and 150 kV) should only be charged for the extension and
maintenance of the extra high voltage part of the grid. Consumers or generators connected to
the high voltage level (70, 36 and 30 kV) should be charged for the entire grid (30 to 380 kV).
This assumes that all power passes through the extra high voltage grid, or at least that all
customers benefit from the extra high voltage grid.
In this respect, the present system with various types of contracts (clients requiring only 50 Hz
and meeting power fluctuations – clients requiring back-up power if available – clients requiring
total system services) could be largely maintained.
                                           
21  This cost, part of the demand component, is considered separately for the different voltage levels, i.e. extra high and
high voltage.
22  The cost of reserve and reactive power, making up the energy component, is considered separately for the different
voltage levels, i.e. extra high and high voltage.24
An energy component
Variable costs, i.e. the costs of losses, reserve and reactive power, are charged per kWh.
In order to avoid cross-subsidies between users at different voltage levels, the cost of losses,
reserve and reactive power is differentiated per voltage level, through a charge based on a
voltage dependent multiplication of the actual consumption.
This simple approach could in the future be replaced with more accurate calculations, which
should indicate – in average, but perhaps not for each individual node - the dependence of
losses, reserve and reactive power on the different voltage levels.
Incentive for dispatching generation and for the siting of new generation or demand
The system operator should provide incentives for both dispatch of generation and for future
investments in generation and new demand nodes to be located at those places where they best
support the overall system regarding congestion, losses (including those under peak conditions),
voltage stability, reliability and safety. A generator may be at a point in the grid where its
presence is essential to maintain voltage stability. Therefore, the value of that generator should
be higher than that of a generator at a very stable node.
For particular investments, the parties involved may require the grid operator to make a
confidential study of the precise effect for their intended investment in the potential nodes.
The node dependent surplus or discount leads to a better dispatching, reducing congestion and
losses and improving the network stability, and in this way encourages efficient use of the
existing network. Furthermore, it also provides a long-term incentive for siting new generation or
demand.
Incentive for efficient operation and network investment
Maintenance and operation
The system operator should be rewarded or penalised for the quality of his operation, including
maintenance, switching of lines, voltage regulation, ... The criterion is the overall system
reliability. The best way to judge this is to measure the amount of energy in kWh that has not
been delivered to the consumers, or the amount of energy not taken from the cheapest
generators because of system failure or congestion. The quality could be compared with
neighbouring systems.
Investment and network expansion
By investing, the network operator can improve the quality and reliability of the power system,
thereby reducing penalties. Furthermore, included in the total cost leading to the basic postage
stamp rate, is a fair return on investment and capital cost.
However, all this may lead to over-investment and a gold plated network. Therefore, an incentive
for overall cost reduction is needed. This is a fundamental problem in any monopoly system. The
best solution is a system of benchmarking, through comparison with similar power systems in25
other countries. Great care has to be taken in selecting systems that are comparable with the
Belgian grid, and in making a fair comparison taking due note of objective differences.
Transparency
Clearly all tariffs – or at least the formula to calculate them - should be published in order to
allow the clients to use the system in an optimal and efficient way. This also applies for the
node dependent Grid Quality Charge.
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Environmental standards in electricity production
Environmental standards, mainly those focussing on air pollution, influence the choice of
generation technology and therefore the cost of electricity generation. This chapter discusses the
existing secondary EU legislation as well as new developments on environmental policy.
Actually, there exist three main directives dealing with large combustion plants. Directive
84/360 sets a framework for dealing with air pollutants from industrial plants and introduced
principles such as prior authorisation of construction of industrial processes and use of Best
Available Technologies Not Entailing Excessive Cost (BATNEEC). LCPD, the Directive on
controlling Emissions from Large Combustion Plants sets out emission standards for particulates,
SO2 and NOx, and emission ceilings for SO2 and NOx. Finally, Directive 96/61/EC concerning
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) requires the introduction of an integrated
environmental licensing system, which will apply to a range of industrial processes, including
power stations larger than 50 MW.
The following developments will affect pollution control for power plants in the EC:
Air Quality Stringent national caps for SO2 and NOx and particulates and lead
Acidification Reducing SO2 emissions across the EC by placing restrictions on the
sulphur content of certain liquid fuel products
Revision of LCPD Overall update, promotion of CHP (Combined Heat and Power)
Water A special Directive on water would set standards and mechanisms for
ensuring that limit values under the IPPC Directive are observed.
Waste Will be covered by the IPPC Directive and by the EC’s existing legislation
on waste.
Kyoto Protocol Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EC is committed to reducing greenhouse
gases emissions by 8% by 2008-2012. In relation to 1990 levels.
The Commission is examining the measures that need to be taken at Community level to ensure
equivalent competitive conditions as a result of environmental requirements to meet the above-
formulated requirements.26
Standards for nuclear decommissioning
Unlike other types of generation, nuclear power plants must include in their cost a factor for the
storage of nuclear waste and future decommissioning of the plant. Diverging regulatory
approaches to the management of decommissioning funds may cause market distortions.
At the moment, there is no specific EC legislation on the decommissioning of power plants, but,
within the single market, a common approach will be needed, also leading to a better protection
of population and environment, to a reduction of waste,… .
According to the Commission, decommissioning costs must be seen as part of the electricity
production and may not be cross-subsidised from the transmission activity nor directly
subsidised via state aid. To identify the decommissioning cost, a detailed preliminary study must
be executed taking into account all the relevant factors such as safety, environmental and
financial issues,…. . The fund must be secured and controlled by the mandated authorities and
only dedicated to decommissioning. The full fund must be available at the foreseen time.
Healthy competition for environmental regulation when there is no transboundary pollution
Let us discuss first the case of pollution that is strictly national: some types of generation plants
only affect the neighbourhood. In this case differences in national regulations should correspond
to differences in national environmental preferences (say lower population density) or differences
in public efficiency. An example of less efficient public regulation could be that marketable
permits are not accepted.
The result of these differences in regulation and preferences could be changes in the location of
power production in Western Europe. A transfer of polluting power production to less densely
populated areas could happen and this is for economists a demonstration of beneficial
international trade.
Unhealthy competition as a result of inefficient regulation of transboundary pollution
Now take the case of pollutants that affect the national population but also affects the bordering
countries. If the cross-border effects are not internalised by every country, unhealthy
competition can exist. Internalisation requires compensation of neighbouring countries for any
damages done to them or at least their consent for any new plant or production. Whenever
transboundary pollution is allowed without internalisation, those countries upriver or upwind will
overspecialise in dirty power production. This is an example of inefficient competition.
The EU commission will face some tough questions here. A first question is nuclear energy.
Some countries want to close nuclear power stations before the end of their economic life
(Sweden, Germany). Other countries (France?) might want to expand their nuclear power
production. Heavy nuclear accidents imply clearly cross boundary damages. Pollution from
normal operation is probably confined to the region. Will we accept that some countries expand
nuclear power while others are trying to close it?
A second case of interest is the CO2 emission reduction ceiling that has been imposed on the EU
by the Kyoto agreement. This global cap has been translated into national caps that are not27
necessarily efficiently distributed in the sense that the marginal cost of emission reduction is
equalised over countries. The result will be a bias against electricity production in those
countries that have received an inefficient cap. This could be overcome by allowing the EU
countries (or the electricity producers) to trade CO2 emission rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although there is a clear momentum and direction towards liberalisation, many issues are still
unsolved. The first 10 years of the British experience learn us that liberalisation does not
produce its full economic benefits when the number of competing producers remains too small.
We identified four major problems in the liberalisation of the European electricity sector. The
stranded cost issue can most easily be resolved by not accepting any compensation for stranded
costs. Cross-subsidy problems between the liberalised and the non-liberalised section of the
market will probably only disappear when the whole market is liberalised. The toughest
intellectual problem is the design of a good transmission pricing scheme. This is now left largely
to the member states so that country experiences might teach us interesting lessons over the
coming decade. Differences in environmental regulation have been identified as the fourth major
problem in the European liberalisation. The solution here has to include a correct internalisation
of cross-boundary pollution.
Liberalising the European electricity sector is not an easy task and will keep us busy in the next
ten years.28
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